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Abstract
The media bank project at the Media Lab is a distributed multimedia object database
which allows clients to produce and consume synchronous data over a data network
such as the Internet. Each server in the media bank can deliver data objects to clients
who request them. This thesis proposes to solve a problem arrising from this system's
openness: any client can obtain any object from the media bank at any time, and
anyone watching the network has the ability to not only read the data but insert
anything an attacker could want. Moreover, running the media bank software must
not open any security holes in the servers. In a commercial environment, the original
design of the media bank just would not do. A set of security services for the media
bank would solve these problems.
The media bank security services start with a secure server which can provide a
secure network connection to a client. By encrypting the data, network attacks can
be drastically reduced. Moreover, a digital movie ticket provides access control to the
media bank data. A digital movie ticket is a voucher token that can only be used
for a specific transaction. A client obtains a voucher for a specific set of data by
purchasing that voucher from the media bank. In this manner, a client is limited by
the voucher to retrieve only the data for which she has paid.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Distributed software systems require distributed security solutions. In a distributed
environment clients and servers speak to each other over a shared resource, the net-
work. Because many people use the same network, servers are required to have some
trust model which defines how to authenticate and authorize clients. Many autho-
rization models have been tried and tested in the past, and new models are being
tried and tested today. This thesis describes a model of security and authorization
for a particular application, the media bank project at the MIT Media Lab.
1.1 Background and Motivation
The Media Bank Project at the MIT Media Lab [11] is an attempt to add synchronous
data types to an environment like the World-Wide-Web. The Web is very good at
providing static data, such as text and images, and provides hypertext links between
different data to allow a document to be presented in a non-linear fashion. However
the Web fails when data needs to be synchronized together, such as audio and video
segments in different datafiles, or, worse, a program that is created by combining
many datafiles, such as multiple streams of video, audio, and other information. The
media bank proposes to solve this problem (see chapter 2).
The basic building block of the media bank is an object. An object is data that
contains some internal coherency. For example, data in one object could describe
data in another object. The media bank is really just a collection of objects and a
set of methods to access those objects.
The building blocks of the objects that comprise the media bank are dtypes [4].
Dtypes are host-independent, network-independent objects that can be created, ac-
cessed, transmitted, and destroyed through multiple interfaces. In particular, dtypes
can be accessed through C++ or Scheme, a LISP dialect. Also, methods exist to
transmit dtypes between machines via the network.
The most useful thing about the dtype system is that it contains an embedded
evaluator. Using the dtype evaluator, a programmer can define a set of primitive
functions and allow a Scheme script to control the execution of the program. However,
this leaves a dtype server open to attack, and a machine running such a server insecure.
In the normal operation of a dtype server, a Scheme evaluator is instantiated and
then the server awaits client connections. When a client connects to the server, it has
access to that evaluator with a shadow of the server's environment. Any commands
the client wants to execute will dutifully be performed by the server; there is no
restriction on the commands a client can run or what data structures a client can
access. For example, commands such as reading and writing any arbitrary file (like
the server's password file) are available to any client connecting to the server. Worse,
a client could rewrite and replace one of the server's functions so later clients would
see the wrong procedure.
Another problem with the dtype system is that all data is transmitted in the clear
over the network. Anyone listening to the network can read all the data traveling
over it. An intruder could sniff the network, pick up interesting pieces of data, and
use that data to his advantage. There is no confidentiality of data traveling the wire;
anyone can read it. While all these problems are not unique to the dtype system or
the media bank in general, running a dtype server opens up more security holes that
can be used to compromise a machine.
Because the media bank is comprised of many objects, as opposed to a single
stream for a single program, it provides a different paradigm of on-demand services.
As a result, new ways of looking at security need to be devised.
In general, security systems consider specific use patterns. One pattern is where a
single security token is good for a single purpose. Another pattern has general tokens
where a single token is good for everything. Neither approach works in the media
bank. This thesis examines the possibility of securing the media bank with a single
token, multiple purpose security system.
1.2 Theoretical Example
Assume that media bank technology is widely used in the future. The neighborhood
Blockbuster uses the media bank to supply home video to its customers. Museums
use the technology to catalog and store art and literature. Advertising firms use the
bank to create references to other material for sale. And through it all, clients pay
for the services that the media bank renders.
If some user wants to obtain some file on Blockbuster's server, all he needs to
do is connect to the server and execute a command to read that file. The server
would dutifully interpret the Scheme code and open the file, allowing the client to
read anything that Blockbuster has on their server. The client only needs to know
what files exist. Yet since the dtype server allows execution of Unix commands, a
user need only ask for a file listing and that information would be found. Limiting
the client's ability to execute arbitrary functions would solve this problem.
Another problem is if some user in one house wants to watch some movie, there is
nothing to stop someone in another house down the road from watching it, too. Since
the data is transmitted in the clear over the network, anyone can sniff the data as it
flies by. Programs can be written to store, process, and use the sniffed data as well.
What if the data being transmitted were financial in nature, a digital cash token or a
credit card number? The network sniffer can pick up the data and an attacker could
then use that information. The worst part of this problem is that there is no way to
know if someone else is eavesdropping on a conversation.
Another related problem is a more active attack, spoofing network packets. A user
could spoof a packet to Blockbuster, making it appear to come from some advertiser,
such that Blockbuster would perform a service for the advertising firm. Then the
attacker can reap the rewards of the service, watching the resultant data, and neither
Blockbuster nor the advertiser would know who did it.
An attacker could theoretically take over an existing network connection. If some
researcher were connected to a museum server, an attacker could use a program to
rewrite the researcher's commands to the server, completely invalidating the research.
Worse, the attacker could get the museum server to execute functions, pretending to
be the researcher, and watch the results. The researcher would be blamed and charged
for the usage.
What if some family wants to watch a movie from Blockbuster, pays for it, and is
given some code to use to actually view the movie? There is no mechanism to stop
the family from watching the movie twice, or three times, or watching it every day
for a week. Someone sniffing the net could see the token and then they could watch
the movie as well. Some mechanism needs to be in place to stop all these attacks.
1.3 Security Services
In order to protect servers and data, a set of security services were developed to
augment the dtype system. Primary motivations were to limit the access a client
could achieve. Moreover, protection from network sniffing attacks was a must.
1.3.1 Securing the Server
One set of security services, the secure evaluator (see chapter 3) was developed to
protect the server machine and the data traveling over the network. This service
limits the client access to the server by restricting the client environment. A client
can only run the functions a server allows it to run. In this manner, a server can be
sure that a client cannot use the Scheme evaluator to attack the machine.
Yet attackers can use other means to break security, such as network sniffing or
actively spoofing network packets, rewriting data to make it appear to be something
else. Just by sitting on the wire and watching network transmissions, an attacker
can usually gain enough information to illicitly obtain services. For example, an
attacker could use a network sniffer to watch a user type a password, he could watch
a filehandle cross the net, he could even employ a program to copy the data from an
object as it flies across the wire. Worse, an attacker can take over an existing network
connection by running software to spoof network packets, to make it appear as if the
client changed locations, or grab some data mid-stream and change its contents.
All of these attacks need to be deterred, and the secure evaluator provides a
mechanism to do so. In particular, it can protect all the data crossing the wire by
using various forms of cryptography. Data can be protected from spoofing or change
by providing a data integrity mechanism. One such mechanism is a digital signature,
where a message is signed using a cryptographic protocol so that anyone can verify
the origin of the message. If a client and a server both digitally sign messages, then
both can be assured that data has come from the other without tampering.
Data can be protected from spying eyes using another form of cryptography, en-
cryption. Only the entities with the proper keys can decrypt and read an encrypted
message. Without the appropriate keys, an encrypted message appears to be com-
pletely random bits.
To realize the secure transmission of media bank data, a transport server was
created (see chapter 4). This program allows clients to connect and download data
from the media bank in a secure fashion. It uses the secure evaluator, which restricts
client's access to various commands, to protect the server from possible attack. How-
ever, it accepts a limited set of commands from clients to access objects stored in the
media bank.
Whatever data protection the client chooses, the identity of the user is hidden;
there is no need to know who is talking. Both entities, client and server, are only
guaranteed a continuity of conversation. In other words, the same entity is sending
requests, the same server is responding to them. At no time does a server need to
know who some client is, or that she really is some specific individual.
1.3.2 Securing the Data
Another service, the digital movie ticket (see chapter 5), was created to protect the
data that is served using the transport servers. While encrypting the data sent across
the net is a good idea in general, it doesn't solve the problem of a legitimate client
downloading data for which he is not authorized to obtain. Perhaps the user is only
supposed to download the data once. The digital movie ticket is designed to solve
this problem.
The idea is that a user can obtain a ticket from a dedicated server and use it to
authorize the download of all the objects that comprise a media bank program. The
ticket is used as an authorization token allowing the client to download a particular
object or set of objects. The token can be checked by the transport server to see if
it has already been used. If it has been used the access can be denied, insuring that
the client downloads the data just once.
The ticket itself can be purchased using some form of digital cash. Alternatively,
objects can be flagged as free objects, which means that they do not cost anything
to obtain. The transport server can decide if it requires payment for its data.
Since digital cash protocols are anonymous, the movie ticket server has no concept
of identity. Again, the media bank servers do not need to know who a client is in
order to serve him. All they need to see is a valid movie ticket, and the servers know
that the client has been authorized to download that object.
However the movie ticket cannot be used just by itself to protect data. Mere
posession of a valid movie ticket provides enough authorization to download data.
Therefore, the movie ticket must be protected while travelling the network. This is
accomplished by encrypting the link using the secure evaluator in the server. Using
the secure evaluator also prevents replay attacks, so the movie ticket server is safe
from an attack mimicing a ticket request.
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Chapter 2
The Media Bank
The media bank is a distributed set of servers that provide multimedia data objects
and information about them. The system is implemented as a number of object
servers and a central database server, which keeps track of all the data in the system.
A client requests information about an object from the database server and requests
more information from the object servers. This chapter describes selections of the
design and implementation of the media bank in greater detail.
2.1 Design
The media bank is designed as a distributed client-server system. The system is a
hierarchy of servers consisting of a directory server and a number of item servers (also
called an object server'). The item server runs on every machine that serves data in
the media bank. The directory server connects to each item server and maintains a
1The original name of the server was item server, however the name is being changed to object
server because of expanded functionality. The terms are used interchangeably throughout this
document.
Directory Server
Object Servers
Figure 2-1: The directory server contacts the object servers to locate all media bank
objects.
list of all objects in the media bank. More information about these servers is located
in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
A client contacts a directory server, which contains a list of all the objects in
the media bank, to find out information about a particular object. This information
includes data such as the location, which consists of a hostname and a port. The
client then uses that information to contact the item server to get more information
about the object, or to retrieve the data it contains (see figure 2-1).
The servers and clients should not depend upon any specific hardware. One of the
goals of the media bank is to provide a system where intelligent clients can choose
the data they require, and an unintelligent client can request the server to perform its
manipulations. An intelligent client is one that knows something about itself, such
as what hardware is available or what formats are preferred over others. Data can be
stored in multiple formats, so a client which knows the hardware on the system can
choose the data format which best suits its needs.
Another goals of the media bank is to provide replication of data. A single data
object can be located on multiple servers. This provides redundancy as well as load
sharing, so a client that fails to retrieve an object from one server can jump to another
server to obtain it.
2.2 Dtypes
Dtypes are a platform independent means to define objects and pass them around
between processes and machines on a network. The core of the dtype system is a set
of primitive objects which are used as building blocks to create more complex data
structures. These concepts also allow multiple-language representations of objects,
and provide for easy communication between programs independent of the hardware
platform. The current dtype system provides for C++ and Scheme definitions of
objects. A list of some of the dtype primitives is in table 2.1.
A complex structure can easily be constructed by combining primitives in certain
manners. For example, a typed structure could be implemented as a vector of pairs,
where the first part of the pair is the name of the element, and the second type is the
value. For example, a timestamp object, which adds the current time to a piece of
data, could be implemented in this manner:
(name . timestamp)
(timestamp . current-time)
(data . object-being-stamped)
)
Indeed, it would be simple to add other information to this object, to build upon
null
boolean
voidptr
symbol
string
pair
list
vector
number
compound
A Null, used to end objects
A simple true or false value, denoted as #t and #f
A pointer to an arbitrary piece of C++ memory
A symbol is a pointer to some Scheme value
A series of characters, denoted as ''value''
Two objects joined together, denoted as (obj 1 . obj 2)
A series of objects created by subsequent pairs and ending in a
nul. Denoted as (obj1 obj2 ... )
A numbered list of objects, denoted as # (obj I obj 2 . ..
A set of different types of numerical representations, including
integers, rationals, and reals, denoted by some representation of
the value
A means to create arbitrary dtype objects. This is a pair where
the first part is a symbol and the second part is some internal
representation of the object
Table 2.1: Many of the dtype object primitives.
it, in order to suit most any need. The dtype system allows objects to be built upon
each other to achieve an end.
2.3 Implementation
This section describes the implementation of the Media Bank servers, the directory
server and the item server. Both servers are written in Scheme and perform a set of
functions. These sections will explain what the servers were originally implemented
to do, and how they can change to support new functionality.
2.3.1 Directory Server
The directory server's role is to keep track of all the objects in the media bank. It
performs this by contacting all the item servers and downloading their database serial
numbers and the names of all their items. The serial number is used to see if the data
has changed; when the serial number increases, then the data needs to be reread.
Different items with the same name are assumed to contain the same information,
therefore equal names are combined into a single object for clients.
When a client makes a request of the directory server, it asks each item server
for its current serial number. If any serial numbers have changed the directory server
downloads the list of objects from the server that changed. Once all the item servers
have been checked, the directory server will honor the client's request. In particular,
the directory server will tell the client what objects are available, and where they are.
In the future, the directory server should also include some amount of information
about the objects. For example, a client should be able to obtain the format informa-
tion about an object, and perhaps even the content information from the directory
server. This way the client only needs to ask the directory server about an object,
rather than recursively tracking the object through all the item servers on which it
resides.
2.3.2 Item Server
Once a client determines where an object is located, it contacts the item server on
that machine. Currently, the item server contains the following meta-information
about an object: name, format, size, encoding, location, etc. This information is
useful to a client that is trying to determine which objects to download and how to
download them.
The item server needs to know all the objects that it exports to clients. Currently
this is done by a flat file that is loaded at run-time. Unfortunately this method is
very static. It is difficult to keep the meta-information synchronous with the object
data when the two are kept separate. For example, if an object changes location or
the data in the object changes, someone has to modify the file of meta-information to
keep it consistent. It would be much better if the meta-information actually resided
with the object itself.
The next version of the item server will actually implement this. Each object will
contain a file named descriptor. dtype which contains the meta-information about
the object. The new version of the item server will look for all these files and store
them in its database. In this manner it can find all the items it serves dynamically,
rather than depending on a file to list all the objects. This also allows easy inclusion
of new objects, since just placing an object and descriptor in the filesystem will allow
an item server to find it.
Currently, a client only talks to the item server to find out how to download an
object and where it is located. This too will be changed in the new version. The item
server will become an object server. In other words, it will be given the ability not
only to distribute the meta-information about an object, but to serve the object data
as well. For a discussion of the protocols involved in the object server, see chapter 4.
One problem with the current implementation is that an item server can export
an object that actually resides somewhere else in the file system because media bank
data is obtained via NFS. A client is told where in NFS to find an object and it looks
for it in the filesystem. In one instance, an item server was advertising an item which
was sitting on the local disk of another machine. The result was that only clients on
the particular machine that had that disk could read the data as advertised. This, too,
will change in the new item-server, since it will look for items in its local filesystem.
The server can be told where to look for objects and will only find objects that it can
actually read.
This thesis involves making the changes to the item server to turn it into an object
server. In addition, small changes are required of the directory server to enhance the
security of the media bank system as a whole.
Chapter 3
The Secure Evaluator
The dtype package provides a Scheme evaluator which allows clients to initialize
and modify state on the server. The server sets up an initial environment, which
each client sees on connection. The client can then modify that environment, create
objects, define procedures, etc. While this might be acceptable for some servers, it is
not acceptable for the media bank. What is needed is a means to allow the client to
only access predefined symbols in a secure manner. The result is the secure evaluator.
3.1 Motivation
An evaluator is a procedure that interprets and executes commands. In normal
operation, the evaluator listens for input, reads in data, parses it, and then acts on
what it finds. Normally the evaluator has some environment in which it operates.
When it finds a token, it looks up the value in the current environment. For example,
if the evaluator were given
(+ 2 3)
it would parse the + as a function, look it up in the environment, and then call that
function with the arguments 2 and 3. This lookup is called a binding, so the symbol
+ is bound to the function of addition.
The default environment contains a function called def ine, which allows a user
to bind data to arbitrary symbols in the environment. In fact, it is possible for a
user to redefine a symbol and bind it to some other value. For example, a user could
redefine the symbol + to perform subtraction. This would cause all future evaluations
of this symbol in this environment to perform the new function binding.
While this functionality is useful in concept, it is disastrous to a server trying to
protect data. Instead, a means to limit the abilities of the client is needed, to protect
the server from rogue or careless users. If the evaluator can limit the functions that
are defined in a client's environment, then the server can dictate the functions that
users are allowed to execute. This is the basis for the secure evaluator.
3.2 Design
The secure evaluator provides two means to protect a server. First, it limits the
symbols in the server environment. This means the client can only execute a limited
number of functions. Second, the secure evaluator provides for link encryption, which
means that all network traffic between the server and client is encrypted in some
agreed-upon method.
The first design consideration for a secure evaluator is a limited environment. The
server needs to decide which functions are exported to the client, and which functions
only the server process should be allowed to execute. Since the server is most likely
written in Scheme, there needs to be a mechanism whereby the environment of the
client can be deterministically set by the server, instead of the client just obtaining a
shadow of the current server environment, whatever that might be at the time.
Once the server has limited the functions a client can evaluate, all other known
attacks are limited to holes in the base operating system, network sniffing, or network
spoofing.' When the normal dtype network protocol is in use, someone could monitor
the network traffic and read the dtype data traveling across the wire. Worse, an
attacker could even take over the network connection, spoofing himself as the real
client. Since data is sent over the net in the clear, the server has no way to prevent
this attack, and the spoofer can gain unauthorized access to data.
To prevent these forms of attacks, the secure evaluator provides a mechanism to
encrypt the dtype data traveling across the network. A client can set up a secure
connection using a key exchange protocol, which will create a context on the server
containing the appropriate security measures. From that point the server will expect
all further communications to be encoded using the mechanisms agreed upon in the
key exchange, and it will encode responses using the same mechanisms. This scheme
protects the data from a network snooper, since anyone watching the bits will get a
bunch of gibberish.
In addition to just encrypting the data, it can be signed using digital signature
technology (see section 3.3.4). Using a digital signature, one side of the connection
knows for sure that the other side was actually the sender. A signature that doesn't
verify properly is erroneous and should raise an exception. However, a message that is
signed but does not have a verification method should be passed on without checking
the signature. For example, the server can sign all its outgoing packets, but the client
can choose whether or not to verify the signatures.
'A clever hacker can break into the operating system of a server and read or modify data in that
manner. Those attacks are not considered in this thesis.
3.3 Dtype Cryptography
The first step in creating a secure Scheme evaluator is adding cryptography to the
dtype system. Since the dtype system is an interface between Scheme and C++,
the most reasonable design would provide the primitive cryptographic functions, and
allow users to put together more complicated systems by combining the primitives.
The primitives involved are random number generators, hash functions, block ciphers,
and public key ciphers.
The plan is to take a pre-existing cryptographic library and wrap Scheme functions
around the primitives. Then a Scheme library can be created which provides a set
of common functions based on the primitives. The next few sections describe the
general functionality and interfaces that are implemented in the dtype cryptography
library.
3.3.1 Random Number Generators
Random number generators (RNG) take a seed and then create random bits and
bytes upon request. It is fairly easy to make a cryptographically secure random
number generator, if you assume that you have some source for good randomness.
For example, taking timings of random keypresses at a local keyboard is a relatively
good source of randomness; watching network activity probably is not [3].
Because of the object-oriented nature of Scheme, the goal is to create crypto-
graphic objects that maintain some internal state and perform some function. A
random number generator object is created by specifying a generator function and a
seed that is used to initialize the RNG. Once a generator is created, a user can pull
off a random bit, a random byte, or a block of random bytes.
There are two random number generators that are currently supported. The first
is a Linear Congruential (LC) RNG, which uses a 32 bit seed and does multiplications
and additions to generate random numbers. This is fairly similar to what is done by
the Unix random function. It is not very cryptographically secure, because it does
not stir the random pool, but it is easy to setup and use.
The second RNG is called X917. It uses a user-defined block cipher to ensure the
randomness of its output. The block cipher is used to stir the bits in the random
pool to ensure a truly random output. This assures that it will generate a set of
cryptographically strong random numbers. So long as there is sufficient randomness
in the initial seeds given to the cipher and the RNG, the X917 RNG should result in
a good set of random numbers. This cipher is created by specifying a block cipher
algorithm, a key for the cipher, and a seed for the generator. In this case, the seed is
the same size as the blocksize of the cipher (see section 3.3.3).
3.3.2 Hash Functions
A hash function takes a block of input and performs an algorithm to convert it into
a fixed-sized block of bits that tag the input. The same input, when run through the
same hash algorithm, will result in the same output. These algorithms are sometimes
called one-way functions, because it is computationally infeasible to find two source
files that hash to the same value.
To break a hash would require a large amount of mathematical work or trial and
error. Changing a single bit in a input file will drastically affect the output of the
hash function. Randomly changing the bits in a file would require 2k attempts to
duplicate the hash, where k is the number of bits in the hash's output. Using the
birthday paradox, finding two random messages that hash to the same value would
require 22 attempts, on average. It is infeasible to break a hash because performing
this many computations is practially impossible.
Two hash functions are currently supported, MD5 [15] and SHS [7]. A hash object
is created by specifying which hash algorithm to use. Data is then fed into the hash
object one piece at a time to update the object context. For example, if a very large
dataset needs to be hashed, one could initialize a hash object and then update the
hash in small increments as the large file is processed. At the end a hash is finalized,
which means that it returns the value of the hash and resets itself to the initial state
for use in a future hash.
3.3.3 Block Ciphers
Block ciphers are also called secret-key ciphers, and are what most people think about
when cryptography is mentioned. A block cipher takes a block of text and encrypts
it using some secret key. A recipient needs to use that same key in order to decipher
the data into something meaningful, otherwise it just looks like random bits.
A block cipher object is instantiated by specifying the algorithm and key to use.
This object can then be used to encrypt and decrypt blocks of data. One of the
limitations of these ciphers is that it has a blocksize, and data must be encrypted in
blocks of that particular size. For example, DES, the Data Encryption Standard, has
a blocksize of 8 bytes. Therefore all DES encryptions and decryptions must be done
in blocks of 8 bytes, even if only one byte of real data exists.
In order to evade this problem, the data is padded out to the first blocksize before
it is encrypted, and after it is encrypted the actual size of the real data is prepended
to the encrypted block. The real size is encoded as 4 bytes in MSB order. This results
in a final block of data with is [datasizelblocksize +4 bytes in length, which is 4 bytes
beyond the smallest blocksize boundary.
Currently, only two block ciphers are supported by the dtype crypto library. The
first is DES [13], which has a blocksize of 8 bytes and a keysize of 8 bytes. The second
is IDEA [10], which has a blocksize of 8 bytes and a keysize of 16 bytes. Since the user
needs to know these data sizes, functions exist for users to determine these numbers
for each algorithm supported. The blocksize is determined by querying a block cipher
object once it is created. However the keysize needs to be known beforehand, so that
can be queried by using the name of the cipher, just like when creating a block cipher
object.
3.3.4 Public Key Ciphers
Public Key Cryptography is a relatively new concept, and puts a twist into the concept
of secret codes. In a public-key cipher, each entity has two keys, a public key and a
private key. The private key is kept very secure, such as on a floppy disk held all the
time; the public key is released to the world, put in a white pages, and printed in the
New York Times. These two keys are mathematically related to one another in such
a way that encrypting a piece of data with one key requires the use of the other key
to decrypt it.
The relationship between public-private keypairs is what enables the use of public
key cryptography. For example, using someone's public key one can encrypt a message
that only the owner of that key can read, since encrypting with the public key requires
the private key to decrypt, and only the owner has that private key.
The reverse is also true. If a user encrypts a message with his private key, then
anyone in the world can decrypt this message using his public key. Since only this
one user could possibly encrypt something with the private key, it is known that this
user must have sent this message. In effect, the user has digitally signed this message.
A public key object can encrypt and decrypt a message, as can a private key
object. Also, since a public key is derived from a private key, a user can insert a
private key in place of the public key operations. But the reverse is not true.
It is technically infeasible using today's technology and today's techniques to
determine the private key from the public key. For example, the RSA cryptosystem
is based upon factoring large composite numbers into two large prime factors. The
largest number of this form to be factored is a 129 decimal-digit number called RSA-
129 which was factored over an 8 month period using 1600 machines in 25 countries
[2]. Normal usage of the RSA system employ keys in the range of 155-400 digits,
which cannot be feasibly broken using the same technology that was used to break
RSA-129.
In reality, public key ciphers are very slow compared to block ciphers or hash
functions. In addition, most public key ciphers are limited in the size of the data that
can be encrypted. As a result, they are usually combined with the other crytography
functions to implement full crypto systems. For example, to encrypt a message it is
encrypted first using a block cipher with a random key, and then that random key
is encrypted using the public key cipher. Alternatively, a message is run through a
hash function and the hash result is encrypted with a private key to generate a digital
signature.
Currently, the only public key cipher implemented in dtypes is the RSA Cryp-
tosystem [14]. In the future, other systems may be added. One possibility is the
DSA algorithm [6] which is a standard put forward by the NSA to standardize digital
signatures. Unlike RSA, the DSA algorithm only supports signatures, and does not
allow for encryption.
3.4 Implementation
By combining the different ciphers and sets of Scheme code, a secure evaluator package
was created which allows media bank servers to protect themselves from rogue clients.
The secure-eval package provides a set of functions that servers can use to set
up, initialize, and run a secure dtype server/evaluator. This section describes the
implementation of this package. For the Scheme code that implements the secure
evaluator, see Appendix B.
The major goal in implementing the secure evaluator was to provide a simple
interface that could easily be applied to any dtype server. By supplying a simple
interface, the job of modifying other software to use the secure evaluator is eased. In
fact, a server can be changed to use the secure evaluator, in general, by changing a
single function.
The secure evaluator starts by creating a server session and running a set of pre-
defined initialization hooks. Once the server is running, it waits for client input.
When a client connects, secure-eval will run a set of server-defined hooks which
can initialize some server state for each client that connects. These hooks allow the
server to maintain information about each client, such as open files or authorization
information.
Once a client is connected, it can run commands on the server. In normal oper-
ation, when a data packet arrives from a client the server will evaluate the packet.
This packet travels the network in clear-text. There is also an option to setup link
encryption. If this option is set, then secure-eval will find the encryption state for
the client and perform the appropriate decryption and verification on the incoming
packet before it is evaluated.
When the evaluation has finished, the server will send a reply back to the client. If
link encryption has been enabled for this client, the server will sign the reply packet
and perform the appropriate encryption before sending the reply. In this manner,
older clients can still use secure-eval servers, but clients that understand encryption
can enable that option and secure the connection. Clients that do not use encryption
are left with a weak link, which leaves the connection susceptible to network sniffing
and network spoofing attacks.
Finally, the server can define a set of hooks to be performed when clients disconnect
from the server. These hooks are useful for cleaning up after a client logs out. For
example, the server can destroy security contexts, close and open files, or accumulate
some accounting information.
In order to provide the security functions, secure-eval keeps a map of clients,
and for each client it maintains a security parameter vector. This parameter can be
set on a per-client basis, since this is what controls whether the evaluator will perform
any encryption functions. The secure evaluator package provides a function to set
the security parameter using public key cryptography as the key exchange method.
If a client wants to set up a secure connection, it generates a random session key,
encrypts that key along with the block cipher name in the public key of the server and
sends it across the network. The server then decrypts this message with its private
key and sets the client's security parameter to reflect this key state. The client can
change the current key at any time by executing the key-exchange function again.
Alternatively, if the client wants to turn off security, running this function with a null
token will turn off all security and return secure-eval to its original functionality,
and susceptible to attack.
It is advised that the server provide a wrapper function around the secure-eval
exported function to the client, rather than providing the original function itself, since
the client should not have access to the server's private key. In the future, it would
be better to provide a real-time key exchange method like Diffie-Hellman [5], so both
the client and the server have some input in choosing the session key.
Chapter 4
Media Bank Transport Layer
The media bank transport layer is the means by which clients can transfer data to
and from the media bank. Once the information about an object is obtained from the
item server, a client uses the transport layer to actually download the data contained
therein. The key design goal of the transport layer is to transmit object data efficiently
and securely to the client.
4.1 Transport Layer Requirements
In theory, any means of transport can be used for the transport layer. However there
are certain requirements that must be met for the transport layer to be useful. Each
of these requirement confines the transport layer further, restricting its generality.
Ultimately, a dedicated transport server will be necessary.
Minimally, the transport layer must take an object name, in some internal format,
and return the object which is identified by the name. This requirement is straight-
forward. A client requests an object by name and the transport layer returns the
object to the client. This could easily be accomplished using something like NFS, the
Network File System, where a client can mount the server's filesystem and read the
desired files directly from the server.
One drawback of this setup is that any possible media bank client needs to be able
to mount every possible server. In addition, those servers become limited in where
they can store objects, since anything on the exported file systems can be read by
network clients.
The media bank requires that only defined objects be available. A server can
choose which objects it will export, and where those objects should be located on
that server. NFS does not fit this requirement, since anyone who could mount the
filesystem could read anything on that filesystem, whether or not the server intended
to export that data.
Next, the transport layer should provide for dynamic access control. This require-
ment means that the transport layer should be able to allow or deny clients download
rights for objects in real time. For example, a client could be restricted to only down-
load an object once. NFS could provide access control by utilizing user groups and
using unix permissions to control the access to objects, but this is hard to change
dynamically, and doesn't provide for one-time downloads.
A media bank server operator may wish to keep accounting information or usage
statistics. Perhaps the goal is to discover the popular items, how often some objects
are retrieved, or what combination of objects are retrieved together. The transport
server should provide a mechanism to allow the provider to keep such data.
Another requirement of the transport layer is security. For example, only the
client should be allowed to read the requested data, and network sniffer should be
denied the ability to read the data at all. NFS cannot provide the level of security
necessary to meet these requirements.
4.2 The Transport Server
Although NFS was useful for prototyping some of the media bank ideas, it does not
fit all the requirements for a secure transport layer. As a result, a transport server
has been created to take over the task of serving media bank objects. This server will
only deliver data that is exported from the media bank (as opposed to NFS which
will deliver any file exported). It can perform accounting, keep track of what items
have been downloaded, and it can require dynamic authorization before it will deliver
an object.
The media bank transport server is a dtype server which provides intelligent meth-
ods for object retrieval. A transport server resides on every machine on which objects
are stored. Clients who wish to download objects from the media bank must talk to
the transport server in order to obtain the data they require.
Because a media bank object can contain a sequence of discrete parts, methods
are required to access the individual parts of an object. In the original design of the
transport layer, it was believed that there were two methods by which a client could
access data stored on the server. The first method is space, accessing the data as
raw bits using a byte offset into the data and a length. The second method is time,
accessing data through some time-based index and retrieving some quanta of data at
that index. These methods are described herein.
4.2.1 Retrieval in Space
The easiest method for a client to access data is to extend the idea of the file system
over the network. The idea behind retrieval in space is based on that of a limited
network filesystem. A client connects to the transport server, opens the appropriate
object, and then reads and seeks into the file at the desired offset, as if it were in a
normal file system. Then the client requests the appropriate number of bytes from
the server.
Using this method to obtain data from the media bank servers, a client needs to
know something about the data it is retrieving. It needs to know about the format,
content, and methods of the stored data in order to access it properly. While it may
be acceptable to require some clients to have this knowledge, it is important to also
allow less intelligent clients access to data.
4.2.2 Retrieval in Time
To access data in time, a client requests a time-offset into the data set and retrieves
an appropriate-sized block of data from the server. The idea behind this retrieval
method was to abstract out the time dependencies of multiple encoding methods, so
the client doesn't need to know how the data is encoded.
For example, take a file containing a sequence of JPEG encoded images at some
regular frame rate. This file would have the property that not every image is the
same size, so it is not possible to just seek to some place in the file to find a specific
data offset. If the client wanted to find frame 1995, or the frame at time-index 66.50
(knowing the frame-rate of 30 frames per second), it would need to either read the
whole file from the start, or know something about how the file is stored on the
server's disk. Clearly this is too cumbersome for this type of data.
If, however, the server was able to perform those functions for the client, either
by knowing the on-disk format of the data, or perhaps having a file containing hints
about the on-disk format, then the client would only need to ask the server for some
known time index to retrieve the data. This is the idea behind the time-domain access
to media bank data. The client does not need to know where to look to find data,
since the server can perform the offset and size lookups on its own.
4.3 Transport Server Implementation
The transport server is implemented as a dtype server based upon the secure evaluator
(see chapter 3). This means that the transport server is using a Scheme interpreter,
but only provides a limited interface to its clients. This limited interface is for security
reasons (see section 4.4) so that clients do not get a full run of the machine running
a transport server. For a full explanation of the transport server functions and the
code that implements it, see Appendix C.
The basis for the transport server implementation is that of a network file server.
A client sends a token to the server and requests a media bank object. The server
validates the token to make sure the client is allowed to download the object. If the
validation succeeds, the server will open the datafile associated with the object and
generate a random handle to send to the client. This handle binds the datafile to the
client and provides some state in the server, which maintains a map of handles for
each client.
When a client wants to access the data in an object, it requests the data, in time
or space, from the server and provides the handle that was returned previously. The
server uses this handle to find the object and processes the request. Because the
handle is stored along with the client state, the object handle will only be useful to
the client that opened the object. In this manner, a network snooper cannot see an
object handle and then attempt to use it, since the attacker will have a different state
on the server so the snooped handle will not be valid.
Once the client is finished with an object, it contacts the transport server which
closes the datafile. This way the server can maintain a list of open files, and if a client
exits without releasing its resources, then the server will close them automatically.
Since the transport server is using the secure evaluator, a client can choose to
encrypt the network session. The transport server supplies the client with a hook to
initialize a key exchange protocol, and also provides each client with the opportunity
to download the server's public RSA key.
4.4 Transport Server Security
There are four aspects of security which are relevant to the media bank. These aspects
are data integrity, data confidentiality, user authentication, and user authorization.
These aspects are described in following sections.
In addition, the transport server provides a limited interface to the client. If the
client were to have unlimited access to the server, an attacker could theoretically
redefine some of the server functions to bypass any form of security. Consequently, a
limited interface is provided to the client so that security can be maintained.
4.4.1 Data Integrity
Data integrity is protecting the transmitted data from change. While the contents
of the data might still be readable via a network snooper, an active attacker cannot
change the data en route. A user would like to ensure data integrity to guarantee
that any data that was transmitted makes it to the other side intac. The recipient
would, at the very least, like to know if the data were altered.
There are a number of ways to achieve data integrity, but it usually involves adding
a digital signature, in some form or another, on the data. This digital signature can
either be a public-key or a private-key signature, since the actual sender of the data
is not needed by an outside party. As a result, it is possible to create a data integrity
protocol using only secret-key cryptography; the two parties only need to exchange a
secret key at the onset of the communication.
One problem with this scheme is a denial of service attack. Someone could modify
the data mid-stream, such that the receiver can no longer decode the data properly.
In this case, the server would not respond to a request, or the client would not receive
the appropriate data. Some data integrity systems provide mechanisms to protect
against these attacks, using error correction codes. The current implementation does
not protect against this attack.
4.4.2 Data Confidentiality
The term confidentiality refers to the actual protection of the data being sent and
received. The idea is that only the sender and the recipient can know what the data
is, and any attacker who is listening to the network can only read random data.
Data confidentiality is provided by encrypting the data in a secret key known to
both parties. Because confidentiality does not suffice for integrity, and vice-versa, the
two operations are called orthogonal. I.e., a connection can have integrity, confiden-
tiality, both, or neither.
4.4.3 User Authentication
User authentication is a proof of identity. It is a means for a server to be sure who its
client is. For example, MIT has a system called Kerberos [9, 16] which authenticates
users to services and services to users using a trusted third party, the kerberos server,
which delivers tokens to its users. Using a cryptographic protocol, a server can be
sure that a user is who he claims to be by reading the token. Since the trusted server
vouched for his identity, the token would prove the user's identity.
In the media bank, a user's identity does not need to be known by the server,
although it would be advantageous for the server to authenticate to the client. There-
fore, user authentication is not used, although server authentication may be used.
4.4.4 User Authorization
Authorization is similar to authentication, except instead of vouching for a user's
identity, the token passed from client to server vouches for the client's ability to
perform some function or operation. For example, the authorization token could tell
the server that this user has the ability to read some piece of data, or change some
piece of information.
In the media bank, the authorization system is a digital voucher system, based
upon the concept of a digital movie ticket, as described in chapter 5. A user presents
the authorization token to the transport server when requesting data to prove the
ability to obtain that data.
Chapter 5
Digital Movie Ticket System
The digital movie ticket system is used to authorize clients to download data from
the media bank. The idea behind the digital movie ticket system is that a client
can purchase a program from the media bank once, and then be allowed to retrieve
all the objects that comprise that program. In this manner, the client only needs
to obtain a single authorization token, or voucher, which can be used to download
an entire program. The system is designed to have a central clearinghouse for the
tickets, allowing media bank servers to verify the authenticity and validity of tickets
before rendering services. However the media bank servers should be able to verify
the authenticity of the movie ticket itself and only require the clearinghouse if it wants
to enforce one-time downloads; servers can opt to perform expiration-time validation
instead.
5.1 Digital Cash
Digital cash, or digicash, is an electronic equivalent to anonymous money. In its
simplest form, the digicash protocol starts with a bank which issues a token to a
client. The client can use that token with a vendor, who in turn redeems the token
with the bank. In order to act like normal cash, digicash requires that tokens can
only be spent once. Moreover digicash, like real cash, has no binding between the
token and the user's identity [1, 8, 12].
For example, if Bob wants to go to a pizza truck and buy a slice of pizza for $1.00,
he just walks on up and hands over the coin (or bill, as the case may be). Similarly,
if Alice wants to buy a piece of data, she only needs to turn over the digicash token.
Just as the pizza truck doesn't need to know who Bob is, the data vendor doesn't
need to know who Alice is. Just like cash, the online token doesn't contain anything
to identify Alice.
In general, digicash can be broken into two categories, online and offline verifica-
tion. Offline verification is where the client and the vendor perform their transaction
at one point in time, and then the vendor redeems the digicash token at a later
time. In general, offline digicash either requires a trusted observer, or enough extra
bandwidth to expose a user when they double-spend the currency.
Online digital cash, however, requires the vendor to contact the bank in the middle
of the transaction to verify the digicash token. The problem with online digicash is
that as the number of clients increases, the load on the banks becomes hard to bear
because of the protocols involved. These protocols are discussed in the next chapter.
Because the bank needs to verify every transaction, as the number of transactions
increases, so does the burden put on the bank's server. The ideas of the digital movie
ticket protocol are based upon online digicash. Since the media bank is inherently an
online system, adding another online server to the system does not add a significant
burden to the whole bank. By offloading the overhead of validating tickets, the
transport server can save some time performing the cryptographic operations, which
can be time-consuming.
5.2 Online Digicash Protocol
Digicash is based upon the belief that in an integral field, exponentiating numbers is
easy, but taking roots, in general, is hard. So, for example, it is easy to perform the
function
x 3modN
however it is difficult to perform
x modN
without knowing the factorization of the field size N. The algorithm described below
is only one form of digital cash. Many other algorithms exist, however only the online
system is relevant to the topics in this thesis.
5.2.1 Digital Signature
If you assume that some entity, like a bank, does know the factors of N, then only
that entity can easily take cube roots modN. The result is that anyone who sees a
number of the form
x3modN
can 1) verify that it is of this form, and 2) know that the entity must have performed
the initial operation. Digicash works by having the client present a coin ID and a
token
x,x3modN
to the vendor, which can verify the bank's digital signature on that token. The
signature is verified by decrypting the token and comparing it to the value of the coin
ID x that is given by the client.
Looking closely, one can see the hole in this statement. Since anyone can perform
exponentiation, it would be easy for someone to let
x = x 3modN
and then present x' as the cube root of x, thereby fooling a server to believe that this
is valid digicash. In other words, a client could generate a digicash token on the fly
by sending the digicash coin
without the need for the bank, and vendors would not be able to differentiate from a
real token.
5.2.2 Adding Secure Hashes to Prevent Client Spoofing
To protect against rogue clients generating tokens, the protocol uses a secure message
hash, like MD-5 [15], Ron Rivest's Message Digest 5, to generate random values. The
protocol uses the hash to scramble the coin id before sending it to the bank. So, the
client generates a random coin ID, x, computes its hash, md5(x), gives the bank the
value of the hash, and gets back this value1
md5(x) ImodN
Now, when the client wants to use the coin, he gives the digicash token (md5(x)31) to
the vendor, who verifies with the bank that it has not been used, and then the client
gives the vendor x, which can be used to verify the token.
Because hash functions are one-way, it is computationally infeasible to compute
x given md5(x). So, a client cannot exponentiate the md5 herself, since computing
the inverse hash is impossible. Hence, that attack is thwarted.
'For brevity, the modN is implied in all further computations of this sort
The only problem with this scheme is that the bank can follow the digicash token
from client to vendor. Since the bank sees md5(x) when it signs the token, and again
when it redeems it, the bank now has a path from the client to the vendor for this
token, and can keep tabs on the client. Since one of the requirements for digital cash
is anonymity, this clearly will not work.
5.2.3 Blinding the Token
The solution is to blind the token before the bank sees it. Recalling that exponentia-
tion is easy, the client can create a blinded token by generating a random coin ID x,
and a random blinding factor, b, and sending the bank
md5(x)b3
The bank doesn't know b, so it can not discover md5(x) from this value. The bank
signs this value, and returns
(md5(x)bs)- = md5(x) b
The client can divide out b, and now has the digicash token,
md5(x) 3
as above. The client cannot use the blinded value as a digicash token, since the client
theoretically cannot find a y such that md5(y) equals md5(x)b'.
When the redemption of this token happens, the bank has nothing with which to
match it, so cannot match the vendor redemption to the client request. The client's
anonymity has been preserved, since the bank cannot track the coin from vendor to
client. Coins cannot be double spent, since the vendor verifies with the bank that the
token has not been seen before. And clients cannot generate tokens themselves, since
they cannot reverse MD5. This is the protocol used by many online digicash schemes
today.
The money is substracted from the client's account when the bank calculates
(md5(x)ba) . The cash is transfered to the vendor when the bank verifies the token.
The client thereby loses the use of the token, and subsequent uses be flagged as double
spending.
5.3 Digital Movie Ticket Trials
Theoretically, the media bank could use plain digicash to pay for its objects. The
problem with this is that some media bank programs may be made of hundreds,
even thousands, of individual objects. If a client had to pay digicash for each and
every object, this would both overwhelm the bank as well as the media bank transport
servers, not to mention require very small values of digicash, which must be in integral,
quantized values.
One solution is to meter the usage and charge the client at a later time. A
problem with this solution is that it becomes impossible to know if a client already
obtained some object. If the system wants to enforce one-time downloads, a client
either has the opportunity to obtain data twice, or gets charged for the same data
twice. Moreover, this solution requires a protocol to obtain payment after the data
transfer, or if pre-payment is used a means to refund the unused portion.
Another solution is to take generalized digicash, and put a limiting factor on it in
the form of an authorization field. This authorization field is used to tell the media
bank servers what program the client bought. The field is also called a pag for process
authorization group. Because of the pag, a media bank transport server only needs
to validate the ticket and compare the pag to the valid authorization fields for an
object.
One requirement for the authorization field is that both the client and the bank
must be able to see and verify the pag before service is rendered. The bank needs to
know the pag before it signs the movie ticket, to validate the user's purchase of that
program. The client needs to see that the proper program is being bought. In other
words, both the client and the bank need to know the pag and prove that the pag is
in the token.
Another requirement of the digital movie ticket is that it should be anonymous.
The identity of the user should not be in the ticket, and there should not need to
be any correlation between the ticket and the user. The movie ticket server should
not be able to track any single token from client to vendor, nor should it be able to
correlate multiple tickets for the same, or any, client for any purpose. To accomplish
this end, a number of schemes were explored. Each different trial is discussed below,
as well as an analysis of their failure modes.
5.3.1 CoinID and PAG in MD5
This trial is just an extension of the digicash protocol presented at the end of section
5.2. The idea is to include the pag in the MD5 calculation with the coin ID. In this
trial, the client would send
md5(x,pag)b
to the bank, and after unblinding would have the value
md5(x, pag)1
The problem with this method is that there is no way for the bank to verify the
pag before signing the token. The bank doesn't know b, so can't find md5(xpag),
and doesn't know x, so couldn't find the pag even if it did know b. The consequence
is that the client can insert any pag desired, and the bank would be none the wiser.
5.3.2 Send PAG separately
Instead of including the pag in the md5 calculation, another possibility is to send a
normal digicash token to the server and include the pag alongside. I.e., a client sends
md5(x)b0, pag
to the server, and the bank sends back
(md5(x)b3md5(pag))3
which unblinds to
md5(x) 'md5(pag) I
This solves the previous problem of the server not knowing the pag requested by
the client. Both the client and the bank can see the pag, and the vendor and bank
can verify this token given both x and the pag.
The problem with this system is that the client, knowing x and pag, can separate
the token into its two parts,
md5(x)3
and
md5(pag)3
and then mix-and-match different pairs of values. For example, a client could purchase
an expensive program once, save off the signed pag for that program, and then in the
future purchase a very cheap program and insert the expensive pag.
5.3.3 Send PAG in Blinded info
This method tries to include the pag in the blinded token by sending it as an exponent
to another value. In this method, the client creates the token ID, x and generates
another value, y, which is relatively prime to md5(x). Putting it together, the client
sends
md5(x)y'd 5(Pa9)b 3
and then gets the return value from the bank, which unblinds to the value
1 md5(pag)
md5(x)3y 3
which the client can attempt to use as the ticket.
The problem with this is twofold. First, the server doesn't know the pag value
beforehand, and even if it did, there is no way for it to verify the pag. Second, the
client could again separate the pag part from the token ID, and create a new pag.
The first problem can be solved by the client sending y and the pag to the server
with the request:
y, pag, md5(x)b3
and then have the server do the multiplication. But even using this method, the
second problem will remain; the client will still be able to pull apart the token into
the ID and pag parts.
5.3.4 Trial Conclusions
In all the trials to design a digital movie ticket, it seemed impossible to meet all the
requirements of the system. In particular, either the server had no way to verify the
ticket, or a rogue client could manipulate the result to generate any ticket wanted.
Neither of these results are useful, however they lead to the conclusion that the
constraints on the system are too tight to allow a solution at this time.
Given the current state-of-the-art, the best solution is to relax one constraint on
the digital movie ticket, anonymity. If we allow the entity that creates the digital
movie tickets to follow that token from client to server and back, if we allow it to
trace the token, then we open up the possibilities for elegant solutions to the rest of
the problem.
Losing this little bit of anonymity is an acceptable loss. There is not a necessary
binding between the client and any one individual, so the server creating the digital
movie tickets need not require a real identification, just real payment. Consequently,
it remains possible to retail inter-token anonymity; the movie ticket server does not
retain the ability to match the identity of any two voucher-holders.
The result is that a movie ticket server has the ability to track a single ticket
through the system, and can obtain the list of purchases done using that one token.
However the server cannot correlate two different tokens to find out if they were used
by same client.
5.4 Digital Movie Tickets
The payment system for the media bank is a digital movie ticket. A client purchases
a movie ticket from a movie ticket server, and can present that ticket to the specific
vendors when obtaining the selection. For example, a client who wishes to view the
movie T2 from the media bank would purchase a T2 movie ticket, and then present
that ticket to the specific media bank servers upon which the T2 movie parts reside;
those servers, or vendors, then contact the movie ticket server to verify the movie
ticket.
5.4.1 Digital Movie Ticket Design
A digital movie ticket is a digitally signed dtype (see section 2.2). The movie ticket
server has an RSA key [14] which is uses to digitally sign movie tickets. The movie
ticket object is converted to a byte-stream, which is hashed using md5, and then
tokenid This is a unique id for this movie ticket token.
now This is the current date/time in UNIX-time, the number
of seconds since 00:00 Jan 1, 1970 GMT.
expires This is the UNIX-time when this token expires.
pag This is the authorization token which describes what this
token will do. In many cases, this could be an object
name, or a list of objects, or a program name, or some
other dtype describing what the user wants.
Table 5.1: The required fields for the digital movie ticket
encrypted using the movie ticket server's RSA key. A client or a vendor can verify
the ticket by converting it to a byte-stream, running md5 on it, and comparing that
to the RSA-decrypted signature.
By using dtypes as the basis for the movie ticket, upgrading the tickets in the
future is easy; just change the data in the object. Another feature of this design is
that the protocol becomes simple, since we already have the means to transmit dtypes.
The only requirement of the system is that the same dtype object be converted to
the same packet format each time it is used. The movie ticket format is a vector of
keyword-value pairs. There are a limited number of required fields, listed in table 5.1.
Because the token is a dtype object, any number of additional fields can be added
at a later time. Optional fields are also allowed. The only requirement, as already
stated, is that the conversion to a byte-stream remain constant.
5.4.2 Digital Movie Ticket Protocol
The movie ticket protocol is rather simple. A client connects to the movie ticket server
and requests the selection. Along with the request, the client sends the payment for
the program. The server creates the movie ticket, signs it, and returns it to the client.
Since the ticket is a dtype object, it is possible to use the existing network trans-
port protocol to transmit the dtypes across the network. The only thing that needs
to be protected is the network traffic, so someone listening to the network doesn't
obtain the movie ticket.
This connection is secured using some public-key technology to coordinate a key
to encrypt the session. Most likely, Diffie-Hellman key exchange will be used to choose
a DES or IDEA key to secure the connection, although some variant of RSA could
also be used to perform the key exchange. In this manner, the client and server can
perform some protocol to choose an encryption key which will be used to secure the
session.
Once the client has the movie ticket, she can present the ticket to any of the
vendors which contain those objects. Those vendors verify the movie ticket, and
allow the client to download the object if the movie ticket is valid. See figure 5-1 for
a representation of the communication paths.
5.4.3 Movie Ticket Server Implementation
The movie ticket server is based upon the secure evaluator package described in
chapter 3. The server waits for clients to connect, and expects clients to use the
encryption methods of the secure evaluator to protect the connection. It accepts some
form of payment, such as digital cash, and returns a movie ticket for the appropriate
selection back to the client.
The movie ticket server needs to be connected, in some manner, to the directory
server (see section 2.3.1). When a client asks for a media bank program by its name,
the movie ticket server needs to find out which objects comprise that program. By
asking the directory server, the movie ticket server has the opportunity the find all
the objects in the media bank which the client wanted and put them into the movie
ticket.
Movie Ticket Server Digicash Bank
Media Bank
vendors
Figure 5-1: A visual depiction of the communications between the client, movie ticket
server, digicash bank, and media bank servers.
Once the list of objects has been obtained, a movie ticket is generated for the
client. The ticket contains the list of objects, the current time, an expiration time,
a token id, and the signature of the movie ticket server to validate the token. The
signature is made using the server's RSA keypair, signing all the data in the ticket.
A transport server takes the token from the client and checks its authenticity
by first verifying the signature on the token, and then checking the validity period.
Next it compares the object request with the token, to see if the requested object is
authorized by the token. Finally, it will return the object if the client is authorized.
Digicash Bankic et Server
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The security services described herein will allow the media bank system to be used in
a commercial environment. Service providers can be assured of both the security of
their servers and payment for their services. Therefore, the goals of the media bank
security services have been met.
One goal of the media bank security services was to allow dtype servers to be
run on a machine without compromising the security of the server or the security
of the data. This was accomplished by multiple means: the Scheme evaluator in
dtypes was secured, the data stream was encrypted, and the data was protected by
an authorization system.
First the dtype evaluator was secured. Originally, any client that connected to a
dtype server could have full run of the Scheme evaluator, which resulted in a full run
of the machine. By limiting the access to a set of server-defined functions, clients no
longer have full run of the server, so security can be maintained. A carefully designed
server can limit the client to only perform functions that the programmer allows.
Second, the network transmissions were secured. A number of cryptographic func-
tions are used by the client and server to setup a secure communication channel across
the network which could be used to send the data. This channel can be negotiated
to require digitally signed and/or digitally sealed objects. In this manner data con-
fidentiality and data integrity is ensured since only the two parties can perform the
required operations to successfully sign and/or seal the data.
Finally, the data on the servers was restricted using an authorization system, the
digital movie ticket. Clients obtain a ticket for the appropriate selection of objects,
and then present the ticket to the transport servers to prove that he is authorized to
obtain the data. A single ticket is used for the whole media bank selection, to reduce
the amount of data that needs to be exchanged. The server can choose how to honor
the ticket.
6.1 Future Work
There exist significant opportunities for additional enhancements to the system: dif-
ferent cryptographic systems can be adopted, alternative key exchange protocols can
be implemented, performance tests can be run, and so forth.
There are many cryptographic systems available today, and more are becoming
available as time goes on. The choices made for the supported dtype cryptographic
systems was to reduce implementation overhead; the algorithms were chosen because
code existed to implement them, and their behavior was well known. However there
are other algorithms that exist today which should probably be added to the repertoire
of functions, such as stream ciphers or triple ciphers, which add speed and security
to the system.
In addition to the bare-bones crypto systems employed, other means of exchanging
keys and performing cryptographic handshakes will be needed. For example, an
implementation of Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange would improve the key exchange
protocol for both clients and servers. It would allow a real-time key exchange which
allows both client and server to have a say in the final key, rather than one side
dictating the key to be used.
Another problem that needs to be explored is testing the performance of the
servers. The dtype system was not written with real-time systems in mind. It would
be a good idea to measure the performance of the servers to see if they can handle the
amount of data required within the time constraints. Right now data can be buffered
by the client, but it would be better if very little buffering were needed.
It is unclear if the dtype system can perform under high load. A single client
works, but running five clients has not been tested. Since no one has tested the
media bank under any load, it is unknown how the servers will react.
Moreover, no one has tested the media bank servers with large databases of ob-
jects, or with many item servers. The prototype system only has a handful of item
servers with a total of only a few hundred objects. It is unclear how the current
system will react to the additional load of many servers and a multitude of additional
objects. Clearly this should be tested at some point in the future as well.
Auditing trails are useful in a commercial environment. They provide information
about usage patterns which can help marketers and implementors alike. For exam-
ple, it would be useful to know which selections in the media bank are downloaded
most often, or whether some scenes are more popular than others in some movie, or
which servers get the largest number of requests. Currently, this information is not
maintained anywhere, but it would be a simple task to add the code to retain this
information.
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Appendix A
Cryptographic Dtype Functions
The following sections detail the dtype cryptographic functions. The primitive func-
tions are documented in sections devoted to the type of cryptography. Following those
will be a section detailing the supplied composite functions that use these primitives.
A.1 Random Number Generators
This section discusses the Random Number Generator. An RNG is an object that
is created with some seed outputs pseudo-random numbers. Given the same initial
state, two RNG objects will output the same set of random numbers. Therefore, a
good random source is needed for the seeds.
Two RNG algorithms are supported, a Linear Congruential RNG, and an X917
RNG. The former algorithm takes just a numeric seed and performs addition and
multiplication, linear functions, to generate random numbers. This algorithm is fast
and easy to initialize, but its numbers are not very random.
The second type of RNG is the X917 RNG. This version takes an argument of a
block cipher and a seed. The block cipher is discussed in a later section. The seed is
a block of data at least as big as the blocksize of the cipher that is used. For more
information on these terms, see section A.3.
rng-create (type [cipher] seed): This function creates an RNG object. To
initialize an LC RNG, the type is 'Ic and the seed is the numeric value. To initialize
an X917 RNG, the type is 'x917, the cipher is a block cipher object, and the seed is
a packet of data at least as big as the block cipher blocksize.
rng-get-bit (rng): This function will return a boolean value, true or false,
depending on the parity of the next byte of random data.
rng-get-byte (rng): This function will return a single byte of random data. In
other words, it will return a number from 0-255 in the form of an integer.
rng-get-block (ng size): This function will create a block of size size bytes
of random data. This random data will be returned in the form of a packet.
rng-noise-source 0: This function will generate a 32-bit random word. This
word is useful for as a seed to the LC RNG. This function uses a number of random
sources on a machine, such as the current machine load and function usage, as well as
some not-so-random information like the current time and process ID, to generate 4
random bytes of information. This information is returned in the form of a number.
A.2 Hash Functions
A hash object is a one-way function that takes input data and creates an output value
based upon the input. Hash functions are deterministic. If the same input is given
to the same hash function, the same output will be created. Two hash functions are
supported, MD5 and SHS.
hash-create (type): Creates a hash object of type type. Uses the MD5 algo-
rithm if type is 'md5; uses the SHS algorithm if the type is 'shs. A created hash
object is returned with its context initialized to the hash starting state.
hash-update! (hash data): Updates the hash context with the data input.
This function changes the context of the supplied hash object, updating it with the
hashed packet of data.
hash-finalize! (hash): Returns a block of data that reflects the current state
of the hash context. When the hash is returned, the context is re-initialized to the
starting state.
hash-hashsize (hash): Returns the size of the data block that hash-f inalize!
will return for the hash. This way a user can know how much data to expect to be
returned from a hash function.
A.3 Block Ciphers
A block cipher takes a block of data and encrypts it in a key such that the original
text can only be obtained by using the same key. Different block ciphers have different
key lengths and different block sizes. The key length is the size of the key used to
encrypt and decrypt messages. A block size is the amount of data that needs to be
encrypted and decrypted at one time. Currently there are two supported block cipher
algorithms, DES and IDEA.
block-create (type key): Creates a block cipher object. The object will use
the type algorithm argument with the key key. For the DES algorithm the type is
'des, and for the IDEA algorithm the type is 'idea. The key must be the appropriate
length for the algorithm type.
block-blocksize (cipher): Returns the blocksize of the cipher object. This
will return an integral value.
block-keysize (type): Returns an integral value of the size of the key for the
type of algorithm requested. The type is the same as that used in the create method.
block-encrypt (cipher data): Encrypt the data with the cipher. The en-
crypted data will be in multiples of the blocksize. For example, if the blocksize is
8 bytes, then the encrypted data will be 8n bytes where n is the smallest value in
which the data will fit in 8n. E.g., if the data is 7 bytes and the blocksize is 8, then
n = 1 and the encrypted data is 8 bytes. This function will return the encrypted data
prepended with a four-byte datalength field used to recover the original data. The
data-length field is a 4-byte MSB-first value that is the length of the original data.
block-decrypt (cipher data): This function takes a block of data in the format
output by the encryption function and decrypts it, and returns the plain text.
A.4 Public Key Ciphers
Public Key Ciphers involve two objects, a public key and a private key. Because
of the mathematics involved in most public key systems, a private key can also be
used as a public key, but the reverse is not true. Therefore, whenever a public key is
required for a function, a private key can be supplied instead without problems.
Currently, only the RSA cryptosystem is implemented. However, the functions
are supposed to be abstract enough to allow for multiple public key ciphers in the
future. Some of them, however, are based upon RSA only, and will change when
other systems are supported. The type of the RSA cryptosystem is 'rsa.
pubkey-create (type n e): Create a public key from the modulus and encryp-
tion exponent. The arguments n and e are only valid for the RSA cryptosystem.
Other systems will require other arguments.
privkey-create (type n e d p q dp dq u): Create a private key from the
modulus, encryption exponent, decryption exponent, the two primes p and q, and
some intermediate values. When other crypto systems are supported, the arguments
will vary depending on what the system requires of its private key.
pubkey-create-from-iostream (type stream): This function will create a pub-
lic key of type type, reading the the data from the iostream passed in. The data is
expected to be in a format of BER-Encoded hex digits.
privkey-create-from-iostream (type stream): This function will create a
private key of type type, reading the data from the supplied iostream. The data
is expected to be BER-encoded in hex digits.
privkey-random-key (type rng keybits): This function will generate a ran-
dom private key of type type with keybits bits, using the supplied random number
generator as the source of bits. This function might take a while to compute the
necessary values.
pubkey-write-to-iostream (pubkey stream): This function will write the pub-
lic key out to the stream in DER-encoded format using hex digits. This output is in
proper format to be read in at a later time by pubkey-create-from-iostream.
privkey-write-to-iostream (privkey stream): This function will write the
private key out to the supplied stream in DER-encoded format. The output will be
hex digits suitable to be read in at a later date. Since the output is a real private
key, user's of this function should take great care in the output this function creates.
Anyone who obtains this output now has the private key.
pubkey-encrypt (pubkey data [rng]): This function will encrypt a piece of
data with a public key, using the pkcs encoding format. The data will be padded
with random data obtained from the optional random number generator. If an rng
is not supplied, the function will obtain random numbers using the LC rng using the
noise source as a seed. This function is used to encrypt a message to a particular
recipient; only the entity with access to the private key can decrypt the output of
this function.
pubkey-decrypt (pubkey data): In order to verify a signature, this function
must be used. This will decrypt data that was encrypted in the private key and
return the decrypted value. It expects data to be in the pkcs encoding format, like
that output from the associated encryption function.
privkey-encrypt (privkey data): This function is used to sign a message. The
message is encoded using pkcs format and encrypted in the private key supplied. The
result of this function is a block of data suitably used as a digital signature.
privkey-decrypt (privkey data): This function decodes a message that was
encrypted for this key. The data is expected to be in pkcs format. The decrypted
value is returned to the caller.
pubkey-extract (pubkey): This function returns a list of values that comprise
the public key. In terms of RSA, this function will return the values of n and e.
A.5 Composite Functions
These procedures are supplied by the cryptographic library to the Scheme evaluator
as a part of the crypto package. These functions are written in Scheme and are
meant to add value to the primitives by providing a consistent interface to many
useful services.
make-signature (privkey data): This function is used to provide a digital sig-
nature on an arbitrarily-sized piece of data. The data is hashed using MD5 and then
the MD5 hash is encrypted in the private key supplied. The resultant private-key-
encrypted MD5 hash is then returned to the caller.
verif y-signature (pubkey data sig): This function is the opposite of the pre-
vious function; it verifies a digital signature. This function will compute the MD5
hash of the data, and decrypt sig with the supplied public key. If the decrypted value
equals the computed hash, then the procedure returns true. Otherwise it returns false.
seal-packet (data crypto-block): When one party wants to seal a message
for another party, this function is used. The data is encrypted using the rules and
methods contained in the crypto-block argument. The crypto-block should be a
state that was agreed upon by both parties using some key exchange method. The
output is a packet suitable to decryption by the next function. This function can sign
a packet and/or encrypt the data. Signing is done first, then encrypting.
unseal-packet (data crypto-block): This function is used to decrypt and ver-
ify a packet sealed with the previous function. The crypto-block is an associated
array of crypto functions agreed upon between the two parties involved in the as-
sociation. If the association calls for encryption, then the data packet will first be
decrypted before anything else is checked. Next, if the data has a digital signature
and there is a signature association, the signature will be checked and the data or an
error returned. If there is no association, any signature on the data will be ignored
and the data will be returned without error.
setup-key-exchange (pubkey cipher key): This function will generate a key
exchange initialization message using the cipher type with the key key, and encrypt-
ing the request to the public key pubkey.
read-key-exchange (privkey data): This function decrypts a key exchange
request and returns data suitable to create a crypto-block. In the future, the key-
exchange functions should probably create the crypto-block itself.
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Appendix B
Secure Evaluator Code
B.1 Exported Functions
The following paragraphs define the functions available to clients of the secure eval-
uator. These are the secure-eval functions that a Scheme server must use in order
to utilize the functionality of the secure evaluator.
secure-eval-add-connect-hook (f): A server that wants to run some function
when a client connects should use this procedure to define a connect hook. When a
client connects, secure-eval will run all of the defined connect hooks before allowing
the client to run any commands. The argument is a function that should take two
arguments, the server and the client: f (server client).
secure-eval-add-disconnect-hook (f): This procedure is used to add a func-
tion that is called whenever a client disconnects from the server. The argument, f, is
a function that takes two arguments, a server and a client. The disconnect hooks are
used to clean up resources that are used while a client is connected or resources that
are initialized when the client connected.
secure-eval-add-init-hook (f): This function is used to set up procedures
that run at server initialization time. The argument f takes a single argument, which
is the server object. When secure-eval creates the server object, it will run all the
init hooks that have been supplied.
secure-eval-current-client 0: This function returns the current client ob-
ject. This is useful for code that wants to find what client is actually calling the
procedure, in order to make per-client decisions.
secure-eval-set-client-security (token private-key): This procedure pro-
vides a means to initialize per-client encryption. The server is expected to create an
intermediate function that the client can execute, which sits between the client and
this secure-eval procedure. The client sends a key exchange request to the server,
which then executes this command in the client's context. The server passes the
client's key exchange token and the server's private key to try to decrypt the request
and set the security parameters. If the token is null, then encryption is turned off.
secure-eval-loop (port environment): This is the server-loop function for
the secure evaluator. Once a server has performed all the initialization it wants, it
then calls this function. The port number is the Unix TCP port on which the server
expects to run, and secure-eval will bind that port and listen for connections. The
environment is the state which defines the function bindings the clients can use. The
server is expected to create an environment and define the appropriate symbols in
that new environment to limit what functions clients can access.
B.2 Secure Evaluator Code
;; The Secure Evaluator
;; Created by: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
;; $Source: / u3/ warlord/ src/ media- bank/ scm/RCS/ secure- eval. scm, v $
;; $Author: warlord $
;;Exported Function List:
;; (secure- eval- add- connect- hook f) 10
;; (secure- eval- add- disconnect- hook f)
;; (secure- eval- add- init-hook f)
;; (secure- eval- current- client)
;; (secure- eval-set- client-security token private- key)
;; (secure- eval- loop port environment)
(require 'dsys 'file 'crypto) 20
;; Global Secure-eval Definitions
(define secure-eval- -connect-hooks '0))
(define secure-eval--disconnect-hooks '0))
(define secure-eval- -init-hooks '0))
(define secure-eval- -pollblock (dsys-pollblock-create))
(define secure-eval--this-client '())
(define secure-eval--client-map (map-create)) 30
;; Set function hooks
(define secure-eval-add-connect-hook
(lambda (f)
(set! secure-eval- -connect-hooks
(reverse (cons f (reverse secure-eval- -connect-hooks))))))
(define secure-eval-add-disconnect-hook 40
(lambda (f)
(set! secure-eval- -disconnect-hooks
(reverse (cons f (reverse secure-eval--disconnect-hooks))))))
(define secure-eval-add-init-hook
(lambda (f)
(set! secure-eval- -init-hooks
(reverse (cons f (reverse secure-eval--init-hooks))))))
;; Obtain information about data structures
(define secure-eval-current -client
(lambda ()
secure- eval- -this - client))
(define secure-eval-client-info
(lambda ()
(map-value secure-eval- -client-map (stringout secure-eval- -this-client))))
60(define secure-eval-client-security
(lambda ()
(vector-lookup (secure- eval -client -info) 'security)))
;; Security Parameters and Functions
(define secure-eval-set -client -security
(lambda (token private-key)
(let ((client (secure-eval-client-info))) 70
(set-cdr! (vector-lookup-binding client 'security)
(cond ((null? token)
' 0)
(#t
(let* ((info (read-key-exchange private-key token))
(block (block-create (car info) (cdr info))))
(vector
(cons 'pubkey private-key)
(cons 'privkey private-key)
(cons 'block block))))))))) 80
;; open and verify the request, returning the value or an error
(define read-request
(lambda (request)
(let ((crypto (secure-eval-client-security)))
(packet->dtype (unseal-packet request crypto)))))
;; seal a reply to the client
(define seal-reply
(lambda (reply) 90
(let ((crypto (secure-eval-client-security)))
(seal-packet (dtype->packet reply) crypto))))
;; perform a secure request, replying securely (exported function)
(define secure-eval
(lambda (request environment)
(let* ((req (exception-handler (read-request request)))
(response (exception-handler (eval req environment))))
(seal-reply response))))
100
;; Process Client Data
(define server-login-client
(lambda (server client)
(map-insert! secure- eval- -client -map (stringout client)(vector (cons 'security '())))
(for-each (lambda (f) (f server client)) secure-eval - -connect-hooks)))
(define server-logout-client 110
(lambda (server client)
(map-delete! secure-eval- -client-map (stringout client))
(for-each (lambda (f) (f server client)) secure-eval--disconnect-hooks)))
(define server-process-packet
(lambda (client packet env)
(let ((security (secure-eval-client-security)))
(if (null? security)
(exception-handler (eval packet env))
(secure-eval packet env))))) 120
(define server-process-clients
(lambda (server env)
(dsys-pollblock-clear! secure-eval--pollblock)
(dsys-station-add-read! server secure-eval--pollblock)
(dsys-pollblock-block secure-eval--pollblock)
(define r (dsys-server-poll server))
130
(define client (car r))
(set! secure-eval -- this-client client)
(cond ((equal? (cdr r) 'login)
(server-login-client server client))
((equal? (cdr r) 'pending)
(define packet (exception-handler
(dsys-connection-read
(dsys-server-client server client))))
(define ret (exception-handler 140
(server-process-packet client packet env)))
(dsys-connection-write (dsys-server-client server client) ret))
((equal? (cdr r) 'logout)
(server-logout-client server client))
(exception (cons "unknown response from server" r)))))
(define secure-eval-loop
(lambda (port env)
(define server (dsys -server-create port))
(for-each (lambda (f) (f server)) secure-eval- -init-hooks) 150
(while #t (printing-exception-handler
(server-process-clients server env)))))
78
Appendix C
Transport Layer Code
C.1 Transport Functions
The following paragraphs define the functions available to a client of the transport
server.
mbank-open (name security): This function is used to open an object in the
media bank. The name is the actual object handle on the server, which is obtained
from the directory server. The transport server looks up the name and finds the local
file(s) associated with the object, and then checks the security object for validity.
If the client is allowed to open this object, as specified in the security object, then
the transport server will open the object and return a handle to the client, which the
client can use to access this object.
mbank-close (handle): This function is used to close an object. The server will
close the resources associated with the object, and close the security ticket associated
with this connection.
mbank-byte s-read (handle size): This function is used to read data out of an
object. It will read size bytes from the object, from the current position, and return
it to the client in the form of a packet.
mbank-bytes-seek (handle position): This function is used to seek to some
position within an object file. The server will seek to the passed-in position in the
object referred to by the handle. Subsequent reads from this object will happen from
this location.
C.2 Object Server Code
;; Media Bank Transport Server
;; Created by: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
;; $Source: /u3/warlord/src/ media- bank/ scm/RCS/transport.scm,v $
;; $Author: warlord $
(require 'scheme 'unix 'gdbm 'map 'set 'file 'crypto 'secure-eval)
10
;; Global Server Definitions
;; setup a random seed for the random uids
(unix-srandom (unix-time))
(define client-map (map-create)) ; map of client->client env
(define senv (environment-create)) ; restricted server environment
(define server-port 20445) ; the port on which this server listens
20
;; Setup the item server information
(define server-hostname (vector-ref (string-split (unix-hostname) ".") 0))
;;(define data-directory "/system/media- bank/server/data")
(define data-directory "/usr/tmp")
(define gdbm-filename (string-append data-directory "/"
server-hostname ".gdbm"))
(define gdbm-file (gdbm-open gdbm-filename 'wrcreate))
(define dtype-name "descriptor. dtype")
(define partition-filename "/tmp/partitions")
(define serial-number 0) 30
;; The movie ticket server
(define mts-server-host "alphaville .media.mit edu")
(define mts-server-port 41923)
(define mts-server-connection #f)
(define mts-crypto #f)
(define mts-cipher 'idea)
(define mts-cipher-key #f)
(define mts-pubkey #f)
40
;; Read in the server private key
(define keyfile
"/mas/garden/grad/warlord/src/crypto-class/src/test/rsakey.dat 
")
(define keystr (iostream-open keyfile "r"))
(define private-key (privkey-create-from-iostream 'rsa keystr))
(iostream-close keystr)
;; Serial Numbers: set, update, current
50
(define serial-clear
(lambda () (set! serial-number 0) #f))
(define serial-update
(lambda () (set! serial-number (+ 1 serial-number)) #f))
(define serial-current
(lambda () serial-number))
60
;; Database Manipulations
(define item-store
(lambda (key item)
(gdbm-store gdbm-file key item)
(serial-update)))
(define item-delete
(lambda (key)
(gdbm-delete gdbm-file key) 70
(serial-update)))
(define database-clear
(lambda ()
(serial-update)
(for-each item-delete (item-list))))
(define database-add-file
(lambda (filename)
(define process-entry 80
(lambda (entry)
(gdbm-store gdbm-file (vector-lookup entry 'uniqueid) entry)))
(define file (iostream-open filename "r"))
(while (not (error? (process-entry (iostream-parse-dtype file)))) #f)
(serial-update)))
;; Given a filename containing a list of filenames, load each file into
;; the database
(define database-load-files
(lambda (filename) 90
(database-clear)
(define file (iostream-open filename "r"))
(for-each database-add-file
(string-split (iostream-read-string file) "\n"))
(iostream-close file)))
(define concat-filename-list
(lambda (files)
(let ((names ""))
(for-each (lambda (name) (set! names 100
(string-append names " name)))
files)
names)))
;; Take the list of partitions in the partitions file, find all the
;; dtypes (look for the dtype- name file), and put all of them into
;; the output file.
(define find-items
(lambda (partitions outfile)
(define file (exception-handler (iostream-open partitions "r"))) 110
(define file-contents (cond ((error? file)
I"/")
(#t
(iostream-read-string file))))
(if (not (error? file))
(iostream-close file))
(unix-system (string-append
"find "
(concat-filename-list
(string-split file-contents "\n")) 120
-xdev -name " dtype-name " -print > " outfile))))
;; Load the database with all the items found in the partitions in the
;; filename given to this function
(define load-items
(lambda (filename)
(define tempfile (string-append "/usr/tmp/" server-hostname ".dtype-list"))
(unix-system (string-append "rm -f " tempfile))
(find-items filename tempfile)
(database-load-files tempfile))) 130
;; Item Server Functions
(define item-fetch
(lambda (key)
(gdbm-fetch gdbm-file key)))
(define item-list
(lambda () 140
(gdbm-listkeys gdbm-file)))
;; Object information -- given a name find object info and things out it
;; Get the actual item information given its name. This should go to
;; the item server on this machine and ask for the item by name, and
;; return what it gets.
;; XXX -- for now just return the name!
(define get-mbank-object 150
(lambda (name)
(item-fetch name)))
;; Return a file path from a url format file:// localhost/...
(define path-from-url
(lambda (url)
(let* ((url-vec (string-split url ": "))
(type (vector-ref url-vec 0))
(path (vector-ref url-vec 1)))
(if (not (string=? type "file")) 160
(exception "unknown URL type " type))(if (string-contains? (string-subrange path 0 2) "//")
(let ((path-vec (string-split path "/"))
(path ""))
(vector-remove! path-vec 0)
(for-each (lambda (p)
(set! path
(string-append path "/" p)))
(vector->list path-vec))
path) 170
path))))
;; Return the path for an object's data. Right now, assume that the
;; object is a valid path, but this can (and will) change to pass
;; in a media- bank item-server object, and figure out the local
;; file system pathname
(define data-path-from-object
(lambda (item)
(let ((data (exception-handler (vector-lookup item 'data))))
(if (error? data) iso
(exception "Cannot find data file")
(path-from-url data)))))
;; Return the path for an object's index file, assuming it has such
;; a beast. If it exists, then this would allow a client to read
;; data in time, rather than in space, from this object.
(define index-path-from-object
(lambda (item)
(let ((index (exception-handler (vector-lookup item 'index))))
(if (error? index) 190
"/*bad-path*"
(path-from-url index)))))
;; Client information -- create, access, and destroy client contexts
;; A new client has connected. Generate state for that client
(secure-eval - add- connect -hook
(lambda (server client) 200
(map-insert! client-map (stringout client)
(vector
(cons 'token-map (map-create))))))
;; A client has disconnected. Let's clean up!
(secure-eval-add-disconnect -hook
(lambda (server client)
(let* ((token-map (vector-lookup (map-value client-map (stringout client))
'token-map))
(uids (map-listkeys token-map))) 210
(for-each (lambda (uid)
(let ((value (map-value token-map uid)))
(do-close value)
(map-delete! token-map uid)))
uids)
(map-delete! client-map (stringout client)))))
;; Return the client environment information for the current client
(define client-info
(lambda () 220
(map-value client-map (stringout (secure-eval-current-client)))))
;; Return the client token- map information for the current client
(define client-token-map
(lambda ()
(vector-lookup (client-info) 'token-map)))
;; Movie Ticket Validation
230
(define make-rpc
(lambda (request)
(if mts-server-connection
(let ((resp (exception-handler (do-rpc request))))
(if (error? resp)
(attempt-connect-mts request)
resp))
(attempt-connect-mts request))))
(define do-rpc 240
(lambda (request)
(exception-handler
(packet->dtype
(unseal-packet
(dsys-connection-rpc mts-server-connection (seal-packet
(dtype->packet request)
mts-crypto))
mts-crypto)))))
(define attempt-connect-mts 250
(lambda (request)
(if (connect-mts)
(do-rpc request)
(exception "Cannot connect to movie ticket server"))))
(define set-mts-crypto
(lambda ()
(if mts-crypto
#f
(let ((key (make-random-key mts-cipher))) 260
(set! mts-crypto (vector
(cons 'pubkey mts-pubkey)
(cons 'privkey private-key)
(cons 'block (block-create mts-cipher key))))
(set! mts-cipher-key key)
#t))
(define connect-mts
(lambda ()
(define conn (exception-handler 270
(dsys-connection-create mts-server-host mts-server-port)))
(cond ((error? conn)
(set! mts-server-connection #f)
#f)
(#t
(set! mts-server-connection conn)
(define pubkey (dsys-connection-rpc conn '(server-public-key)))
(if (not mts-pubkey)
(set! mts-pubkey
(pubkey-create 'rsa (car pubkey) (cdr pubkey)))) 280
(set-mts-crypto)
(printing-exception-handler
(dsys -connection-rpc conn
(list 'set-security
(list 'quote
(setup-key-exchange
mts-pubkey
mts-cipher
mts-cipher-key)))))
#t)))) 290
;; Check if an object is valid given a ticket
;; XXX: this needs to be fixed in a future version.
(define object-in-ticket?
(lambda (object ticket)
(define pag (vector-lookup (car ticket) 'pag))
#t))
;; (set-contains? pag (vector-lookup object 'uniqueid))))
;; If the MTS ever gets a full set of objects, then use this.
;; Otherwise, we could do a reverse-map, change the data in here to be 300
;; a string rather than a set, and then see if the object is a part
;; of the program defined in the ticket.
;; This function validates a security object.
;; First, check if the object has a price. If the price is 'free then
;; approve the download. Next, check the ticket's validity. Finally,
;; check to see if the ticket is valid for this object
(define validate-security
(lambda (object security) 310
(define price (exception-handler (vector-lookup object 'price)))
(if (and (not (error? price))
(equal? price 'free))
#t
(let ((val (printing-exception-handler
(make-rpc (list 'validate-ticket (list 'quote security)
(vector-lookup object 'uniqueid))))))
(if (error? val)
#f
(if val 320
(object-in-ticket? object security)
val))))))
;; This function tells the MTS that we're done with an object
(define object-done
(lambda (object security)
(make-rpc (list 'turnin-ticket (list 'quote security)
(vector-lookup object 'uniqueid)))))
330
;; Set Security Operations for this connection -- choose confidentiality
;; and integrity methods for this connection
(define set-security
(lambda (token)
(secure-eval-set-client-security token private-key)))
(define server-public-key
(lambda ()
(pubkey-extract private-key))) 340
;; Code to open and close -- these are the "exported" routines, plus
;; their helper functions
;; Generate a UID for a client
(define generate-uid
(let ((uid-size 16777216)) 2^24
(lambda ()
(unix-random uid-size)))) 350
;; Actually perform the open
(define do-open
(lambda (item ticket)
(let* ((info (vector (cons 'item item) (cons 'ticket ticket))))
(set! info (vector-concat info (mbank-open-data item)))
(set! info (vector-concat info (mbank-open-index item)))
info)))
;; Actually perform the close 360
(define do-close
(lambda (value)
(object-done (vector-lookup value 'item) (vector-lookup value 'ticket))
(mbank-close-data value)
(mbank-close-index value)))
;; The global open -- this will then do the appropriate opens
;; for the valid functions for this type of object
(define mbank-open
(lambda (name security) 370
(let ((uid (generate-uid))
(token-map (client-token-map))
(item (get-mbank-object name)))
(cond ((validate-security item security)
(map-insert! token-map uid (do-open item security))
uid)
(#t
(exception "Authorization failed"))))))
;; The global close -- this will do the appropriate closes for this 380
;; uid (object) and remove it from the token-maps.
(define mbank-close
(lambda (uid)
(let* ((token-map (client-token-map))
(value (map-value token-map uid)))
(do-close value)
(map-delete! token-map uid))))
;; Open the stream for an object 390
;; (mbank- open- data object) -- returns a vector of data cons cells
(define mbank-open-data
(lambda (item)
(let* ((path (data-path-from-object item))
(f (exception-handler (iostream-open path "r"))))
(if (error? f)
(exception (stringout "Error opening file " path)))
(vector
(cons 'data-stream f))))) 400
;; (mbank-open-index object) -- returns a vector of index cons cells
(define mbank-open-index
(lambda (item)
(let* ((path (index-path-from-object item))
(f (exception-handler (iostream-open path "r"))))
(vector
(cons 'index-stream
(if (error? f)
'0 410
;; Close the streams, given an object vector
;; (mbank- close- data value)
(define mbank-close-data
(lambda (value)
(let ((f (vector-lookup value 'data-stream)))
(if (not (null? f)) 420
(iostream-close f)))))
;; (mbank- close- index value)
(define mbank-close-index
(lambda (value)
(let ((f (vector-lookup value 'index-stream)))
(if (not (null? f))
(iostream-close f)))))
430
;; Get the proper stream from the uid for a client request
;; Get the data stream from a uid.
(define get-data-stream
(lambda (uid)
(let* ((token-map (client-token-map))
(value (map-value token-map uid))
(item (vector-lookup value 'item)))
(vector-lookup value 'data-stream))))
440
;; Get the index stream from a uid.
(define get-index-stream
(lambda (uid)
(let* ((token-map (client-token-map))
(value (map-value token-map uid))
(item (vector-lookup value 'item)))
(vector-lookup value 'index-stream))))
;; BYTE functions: Read and seek by byte offset 450
;; (mbank- bytes-read uid length) -- returns a packet
(define mbank-bytes-read
(lambda (uid length)
(let ((f (get-data-stream uid)))
(if (not (null? f))
(iostream-read f length)
(printout "No data stream for handle " uid "\n")))))
;; (mbank- bytes-seek uid position) 460
(define mbank-bytes-seek
(lambda (uid pos)
(let ((f (get-data-stream uid)))
(if (not (null? f))
(iostream-seek f pos)
(printout "No data stream for handle " uid "\n")))))
;; TIME functions: Read by time offset. Not all items have this
;; ability. 470
;; Setup the environment
(define add-symbols
(lambda (env symbols)
(for-each (lambda (s) (apply environment-define (list env s s))) symbols)))
(add-symbols senv 480
'(mbank-open mbank-close mbank-bytes-read
mbank-bytes-seek set-security item-list
item-fetch serial-current server-public-key
quote cons vector list printout stringout
current-environment and or not))
(load-items partition-filename)
(secure-eval-loop server-port senv)
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